Independent Local Lists in
The paper deals with independent local lists ín Croatia, ín both analytíc and theoretical way. At thè beginning, thè development and current state of local self-government and local politicai System in Croatia are described. Data on the independent local lists' participation and success during the 2005 general local élections are presented and analysed. Four theoretical approaches are proposed for an interprétation of the results: System, transition, neo-institutional and démocratisation theoiy. None of them can alone explain the results ín a satísfactoiy manner. That is reason why the author proposes a composite theoretical frame, which can explain the rôle and influence of a broader relevant context on the independent local lists' élection success. Certain theoretical hypothèses are generated and to some extent verífíed ín this paper. The advantages of the independent local lísts and certain success factors of such lists are ídentífíed. Additional theoretícal work and empírí-cal vérification are needed. Both qualitative insights and quantitative research can be useful.
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HRVATSKA JAVNA UPRAVA Introduction** In the process of décentralisation of compétences and financial décen tralisation, local self-government system in Croatia is still dealing with the steps of institution development, as in many other transition countries.
Independent local lists continue to be the connecting point at the crossroads of local self-government system and politicai system of a countiy. Local self-government Systems are comprised of at least two components* 1 -politicai and administrative. The politicai one is connected with the issues of local democracy, politics and public policies at local level. The admini strative one is concerned with policy implémentation, production of public services at local level, including communal utilities and social services, rôle of local self-government in the whole public administration system, etc.
However, the whole politicai system can be seen as comprised of several different but interconnected layers -central, regional, local, and so forth. It seems obvious that along with thè politicai rôle of local self-govern ment, there are others, and that besides local part there are other territo rial levels in the whole politicai system. What connects both Systems -self-government and politicai -is their presumed orientation towards citizens. From this point, what prevails is the notion of localness, local self-government and local (part of) politicai system, with independent local lists in thè focus. I will try to analyse in dependent local lists in Croatia havíng ín mind thè described integrative ** This article is adapted paper presented atthe scientific workshop Independent Local Lists in Europe -A Comparative Perspective held at Martin-Luther-University Halle-Witten berg, Halle (Saale) on 13-14 April 2007.
1 Financial one can also be mentioned.
During the socialist Yugoslavia, self-management became part of the of ficial ideology and a widespread practice with regard to territorial self--government, economic System, and politicai System. Self-management in socialist communes -local communities in Marxist form -had much in common with the autonomous processes of classical local self-govern ment and direct democracy, but without multiparty compétition. The whole System was strongly local-oriented, at least within the frame of each Yugoslav republic. Th us, at thè end of the 1980s, Croatia inheríted a very strong local level and relatively weak republic level, in terms of compé tences, finances, civil servants, etc.3
2 Details can be found in Lozina, 2004: 39-100; Hrženjak, 2004: 2-22; Čepulo, 2000; Perko-Šeparović and Hrženjak, 1982: 57-81. 3 For more details see Koprić, 2003, pp. 183-187 ; see also Petak, 2006, pp. 85-87 . (Antic, 2002) . Right-wing government elected at the end of 2003 has also proclaímed décentralisation policy and announced a few décentralisation steps. However, despite certain changes of le gai régulation, there is no significant dé centralisation in terms of compétences and finances. Croatia has a kind of hesitating décentralisation and continues to be a highly centralised coun try (Koprić, 2007a) .
At the beginning of the 1990s, Croatia was divided into approximately one hundred communes. The new territorial Organization was two-tier,
HRVATSKA JAVNA UPRAVA 4 The Republic of Croatia was at that time still part of Yugoslavia. There was no regional level at that time.
5 Interesting research and theoretical approach about the first démocratie élections can be found in Grdešić et al,, 1991. 6 The Constitutional Amendments (2000 and hâve accepted the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity, widened the compétences, redesigned counties as units of regional self-government, and granted forms of self-government below municipal level with legal entity.
with communes (općina) and towns (grad) at the municipal level and counties (županija) at the second level. At . Secondly, a new category of large towns was introduced by the amendments on that Law passed in 2005. There are fifteen towns with more than 35.000 inhabitants, without the City of Zagreb, which are considered to be large towns (Appendix 2).
It should be noted that the forms of self-government below municipal level hâve to be established within each local self-government unit. They can be established so as to encompass one settlement, a few smaller settlements, or even one part of a settlement. They can be established as territorial committees (mjesni odbori), town districts (gradski kotareví), and city quarters (gradske četvrti; only in the City of Zagreb). Originally conside red as the forms of citízens' participation in local public affaire, they were 7 There are 3.065.473 inhabitants in towns, and 1.371.987 in communes (total is 4.437.460). -Pavić, 2006: 228-229. 8 With the population of 779.145, the City of Zagreb is the biggest local self-govern ment unit in Croatia.
9 Fór more details see Ivanišević et al,, 2001; Koprić, 2003; Koprić, 2003a; There are two executive bodies in each local and regional unit -executive board (poglavarstvo) and an individual executive functionaiy who is at the same time president of the executive board (see also 10 Municipal unite with less than 3.000 inhabitants can hâve représentative bodies consisting of 7-13 seats, municipalities with 3.001-10.000 inhabitants can hâve bodies of 9-15 seats, municipalities with 10.001-30.000 inhabitants can hâve bodies of 13-19 seats, towns with more of 30.000 inhabitants can hâve représentative bodies of 19-35 members, county assemblies can consist of 31-51 seats, and the City Assembly of the City of Zagreb consiste of 51 seats. The number of seats in the représentative bodies of the forms of territo rial self-government below municipal level is regulated by the municipal Statutes. This somehow opens thè issue of thè direct democracy and thè forms of direct democracy at thè local level. The Law on Local and Regional Self-Government provides for certain forms of direct democracy. These are referendum, consultative referendum, locai citizens' meeting, citizens' initiative, and various forms of territorial self-government below munici pal level. Generally speaking, they have been rarely used so far, but when used, they were efficient. They are not, as in most other countries, thè main politicai channels of influence, nor thè most important politicai in-HRVATSKA JAVNA UPRAVA 12 Independent local list, according to thè Law on thè Election of Members of the Représentative Bodies of Local and Regional Self-Government Units, are those lists which are nominated by a group of voters themselves. There should be 100 voter signatures for a communal list, 150 for a town list, and 500 for a county list or for an independent Est in the City of Zagreb in order for the list be legally valid. The number of such an independent list members should be the same as the number of members of a local représentative body. Behind such a list there can be a civil society organization, a strong personality with his/her friends or family, a company, a group of citizens, party or non-party members, or someone else. However, the officiai name of the list should be »independent communal / town / city / county list«. 13 The Serb minority is the biggest national minority in Croatia. The share of that minority in the population is the highest in Vukovarsko-srijemska County (15.5 %). Its presence in other counties is as follows: 11.7 % in Sisačko-moslavačka county, 11.5 % in Ličko-senjska county, 11 % in Karlovačka county, 9.1 % in Šibensko-kninska County, 8.7 % in Osječko-baranjska County, 7.1% in Bjelovarsko-bilogorska and in Virovitičko-podravska Counties, and 6.5 % in Požeško-slavonska County. Italian minority reaches 6.9 % in the population of Istarska County. The presence of other national minorities is more dottedlike. There is Hungárián minority in certain units on the territory of Osječko-baranjska and Vukovarsko-srijemska Counties. There are 40.9 % of the Hungarians in the population of the Commune of Kneževi Vinogradi, 35.1 % in the Commune of Bilje, 26 % in the Com mune of Draž, 21.6 % in the Commune of Ernestinovo, 18 % in the Commune of Tordinci, 14.4 % in the Commune of Petlovac, etc. The biggest Check minority is on the territory of Bjelovarsko-bilogorska County, precisely in the Communes of Končanica (46.7 %) and Dežanovac (23.5 %), and in the towns of Daruvar (18.9 %) and Grubišno Polje (18 %). The presence of the Remanies is the biggest on the territory of Međimurska County, especially in the Communes of Orehovica (8.6 %) and Mala Subotica (7.6 %). Other represented na tional minorities are the Bosnians, Albanians, and Slove nians in certain parts of thè country - Hrženjak, 2004: 42-148 14 One recent research in Croatia has shown that only 56 % of the young (secondary school) generation sees démocratie politicai System as a désirable solution (Vujčić, 2006 (Podolnjak, 2005) , but thè majority of them have been warning and raising questions about the potential risks of such a solution (see Ko prić, 2005; Sokol, 2006: 3; see also Larsen, 2002 HRVATSKA JAVNA UPRAVA 16 The total sum of money for politicai parties and independent members should be calculated so as to amount 0.056 % of total budget expenses in the respective unit for previ ous year. The total sum is divided with the total number of représentative body members and should be paid to thè politicai parties and independent members (members elected from the independent lists). The amount is raised 10 % for every iemale member. Political parties hâve been getting sums which dépend on their member share in a représentative body. Re présentative bodies' members elected from the independent lists hâve been getting money on their special bank accounts. To prevent the after-election fragmentation and manipula tions with budget money, it is stipulated that after-election changes in party membership as a rule cannot change financial support sums that hâve once been determined on the basis of élection results (Articles 7-13). a coalition, having 32 of 51 seats. Certain concrete circumstances caused disharmony, sometimes even a conflict between the coalition partners. Having in mind that the City of Zagreb is the greatest, economically and in other ways the most important local unit in Croatia, it is not hard to imagine that disharmony in the ruling coalition was an eveiyday media and public topic. With some other examples, this significanti^ contributed to voters' negative impressions about locai politics. However, this caused only a slight increase of the share of independent lists' seats in the City of Zagreb Assembly after the 2005 élections, írom 9.8 to 13.7 % (see Ap pendix 8). Nevertheless, changes in the share of seats of certain politicai parties were substantial (Ivanišević, 2006 The data on the number of independent lists and their success in rural and urban municipalities show a great différence and tentatively confirm 18 In the well-known example of Mošćenička Draga, the major who has won several subséquent mandates with his independent list is at the same time afisherman. His list won 5 of 9 seats in the last élections of 2005.
19 For example, the independent list which succeeded in gaining 4 seats in the Town Council of Split is led by the former well-known basketball player Željko Jerkov, who has been a very successful businessman for some time. In the City of Zagreb Assembly 4 seats were gained by the independent list led by Tatjana Holjevac, daughter of one of the most populär City Mayors ever, Većeslav Holjevac. In the City of Zagreb Assembly 3 seats were won by the independent list of Boris Mikšić, the man who returned from the USA with rather fuz2y curriculum vitae, with snob-like manners, pretending to be successful business man. The independent list led by Plinio Cuccurin won in the Commune of Bale Council. Cuccurin is very well-known member of the Board of Directors in thè biggest tobacco com pany in the region. Stipo Gabrić, considered as one of the rieh tycoons (persons who have suddenly succeed in becoming rich during the non-transparent privatisation of the former so-called social ownership under suspicious circumstances) and one of the best-known dis sidents from the long time leading Croatian politicai party, HDZ (Croatian Démocratie Community), led victorious independent list in the Town of Metković ( 11 of 17 seats; 64.7 %) and the successful independent list for County Assembly of the Dubrovačko-neretvanska County (7 of 41 seats; 17.1 % 20 During its history, Croatia usually had the second tier of government, but with dif ferent rôles, compétences, number of units, etc. Counties as part of the common Hungárián and Croatian héritage were re-established in the early 1990s. However, they are of relativelly small size, with average size of 2.800 square kilométrés and 183.000 inhabitants (the City of Zagreb excluded). They have not beenformed with respect to historical Croatian régions such as Slavonia or Dalmatia. Politicai needs and respects have overwhelmed historical, social, legai and technical criteria of county mapping (see also Antulov, 2000: 6) .
The case with thè independent list of Branimir Glavaš in Osječko-baranjska County has certain similarities with thè previously described case, but also a few essential différences. Glavaš Both cases hâve shown that the situation that can help certain indepen dent list to succeed ín units such as Croatian countíes has to be very strong and specific. The data on the success of independent lists at both local and county levels show that the chances to succeed are goíng to dí-mínish at eveiy wider level of thè governance System. Data on the results of independent lists at the national level are goíng ín the same direction -not one independent list was successful ín the parliamentaiy élections of 2000 and 2003 (Kasapovic, 2004: 85) .23 21 Croatia used to be considered a three-part state (Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia) since thè Middle Ages.
22 It includes five counties: Osječko-baranjska, Vukovarsko-srijemska, Požeško-slavonska, Virovitičko-podravska, and Brodsko-posavska.
23 There were 57 independent lists in the parliamentary élections of 2003, ail unsuccessful (Kasapovic, 2004: 85) . In previous parliamentary élections there were a few inde pendent members in Croatian Parliament (Sabor), because of at least partial usage of the plurality rule (»winner-takes-it-all«). Their number was 1 (1.25 %) in the 1990 élections, 5 (3.62 %) in the élections of 1992, 4 (3.15 %) in the élections of 1995, and 3 (1.99 %) in the élections of 2000 (Čular i Blanuša, 2001: 229 24 In 2001 general local élections there was a similar pattern of the independent local lists participation. In the six Coastal counties independent lists competed in 62.9 % of local units, while in the continental part of thè country independent lists competed in 54 % of local units (Kasapović, 2004: 87-88 Nevertheless, it should be noted that a major part of that county was engulfedby the war and the Serb minority rébellion (1991-1996) . In tenyears that elapsed between the censuses of 1991 and 2001, Sisačko-moslavačka County was faced with an enormous dépopulation and changes in the population structure. The number of inhabitants decreased from 286.914 to 185.387 (dépopulation of 35.4 %), and the share of the Serb minority feil from 34.5 % to 11.7 % (Hrženjak, 2004: 103) . In a situation with many unresolved after-war problems, it can be logically expected that the Serb minority is tiying to find an alternative politicai way to gain positions in local représentative bodies through independent lists, and not through In an attempt to answer these and similar questions, the transition theory should be taken into account, also.30 There are many various notions of 29 Crédits for this insight should be given mainly to Niklas Luhmann. See, for exam ple, Pusić, 1989: 61-62 . About the concept of autopoiesis and its usage in different fields, including organisation and social Systems, with critics on the Luhmann's contribution, see Minge rs, 1995. 30 In such a way Lewis argues: »In view of the short time that has elapsed since 1989 and the wide-ranging nature of the transformation that has occurred since then CE party (Putnam, 1993: 17) . In other words, broader sociétal context, culture and other factors should be taken into account.31 Finally, rules are product of sociétal context and live and function in sociétal con-31 Woliman daims that several factors should be taken into considération in explaining the cross-countiy variance of the public sector reform trajectories: socio-economic con text, institutional and cultural tradition and »path dependencies«, institutional setting (polity), constellation of relevant politicai and socio-economic actors, reform coalition, starting conditions. -Woliman, 2001: 15-16. text. Just knowing thè rules is not enough; research on real life of raies (on independent local lists and other issues of local politicai System, for example) in society is a much more productive approach. Another aspect of institutional approach, which can be named »historical-institutionalist approach« (Wollmann, 2000) , has been searching for identification of different phases in the institution building. Such an approach can show transition as a chain of institutional choices and sequence of phases in developing certain institutions, including independent local lists. (Lijphart, 1992: 32) .
32 There are a lot of other conceptualizations. Dahl has, for example, invented the concept of polyarchy, meaning a politicai System which is at the same time liberal and par ticipative (Dahl, 1998) . Almond and Verba have considered the balance between efficient power to rule and accountability to citizens as one of the most important pillars of democ racy. Such a balance can be best kept in conditions of the civic culture (Almond and Verba, 2000: 351, and subséquent (Koprić, 2006a: 254-255) . This is one of the main reasons why »the introduction of new institutions of local democracy was an inherent and important part of the comprehensive reforms of the early 1990s in EastCentral Europe« (Baldersheim, 2003: 241 On the one hand, by opening possibility to certain small groups of citizens to enter into local électoral compétition relatively easy and by widening citizens' élection choices, independent local lists are close to the instru ments of direct democracy. They are a way of growing direct democracy into représentative democracy. However, direct democracy also has 33 Zakošek considère three main cleavages in Croatian transition society which hâve influenced voters' behaviour: territorial-cultural, ideological-cultural, and socioeconomic cleavages (Zakošek, 2001: 108-110) . Šiber has researched two main cleavages in Croatia, historical (two sides duringthe Second World War) and national (Šiber, 1998). well-elaborated shortcomings, where thè possibility of manipulation is thè most important one.34 On thè other hand, représentation is nowadays seen as part of democracy or even as a better instrument of democracy than forms of direct democracy (Offerdal, 2003: 274-276) .
The practice of independent members of local councils in Croatia shows good and bad démocratisation potential of independent lists. In many local units they promote thè interests of some groups of citizens in a legitimate manner. They are really able to introduce more personal politicai engagement and familiarity of municipal politicians with their electorate. These are the reasons why assessments according to which their rôle is quite and generally negative (Kasapović, 2004: 93) (Kasapović, 2004: 89) . Certain lists enter intő coalitions after real blackmaíling. The possibility of forming independent lists with intention to facilitate the abuse of financial donations cannot be excluded, which was one of the reasons fór passing the new Law on Financíng of Political Parties, Independent Lists and Candidates of 2007. Some of the lists were obviously hídden or reserve lists of certain politi cai parties, entering intő coalition with the »mother-party« immediately after élections. That shows a kind of cheating politicai behaviour. One of the motives for forming independent list can be quite lucrative, as every party and independent member of a représentative body hâve the right to finances for regulär activities.35 Etc.
34 About the shortcomings of referendum see, for example, Cerar, 2001. 35 There is a well-known case of changing status from party members to independent members in the Croatian Parliament during the mandate 2003-2007, mainly because of thè rather high amount of money for regulär activities. The initiative came from the leading party that has a weak majority. It is considered to be a mode of politicai corruption whose purpose to weaken thè politicai opposition and stabilise the Government. The same could be possible at local and regional levels, too. (Zakošek, 1998: 48 (system, transition, neo-institutional, démocratisation theory) 
